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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington, D.C. 20505

ICS 0791-88
4 March 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Executive Secretary
          DCI Security Forum

SUBJECT: Minutes of Sixteenth Meeting, DCI Security Forum,
          8 February 1988

25X1

1. The following is a record of events that took place at the DCI
Security Forum meeting on 8 February 1988 in Room 6100, Main Justice, from
1300-1430 hours. Attendees were those persons identified below. The NSC and
State representatives were absent. All other agencies and departments were
represented.

25X1
25X1   George Alvarez, Marine Corps   NSA
          Gary Stoops, FBI
25X1   CIA   Ted Konduris, AF/INS
25X1   DIA   Maurice Ralston, OSD, C^{3}I
25X1   CIA   NSA
25X1   Maynard Anderson, OSD   Dick Schmeltz, Navy
25X1   Edward J. Pollard, Treasury   NSA
          Gene Bacher, DoE
          Bill O'Donnell, Treasury   Mark Pelensky, Navy
25X1   ICS   George Henriksen, Navy
25X1   James Passarelli, Army   Jerry Rubino, Justice

25X1   2.   presided as Acting Chairman over the body for this
meeting. As first order of business, the minutes of the fifteenth meeting
were accepted and approved without revision. The next business item consisted
25X1   of an update briefing on the status of DCID 1/16 by   Information
25X1   Handling Committee, Intelligence Community Staff.   reported that
the 18-month effort of IHC in revision of the DCID was coming to a close. It
was projected that the DCID package would be presented to the DCI within 60
days. It was reiterated that initially there were close to 60 major issues

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that have now been reduced to four. The near- and long-term goals for implementation were restated as 1992 and 2000, respectively. The major unresolved issues, some or all of which may have to go to the DCI for resolution, were identified and are described cryptically here for brevity since we have heard and seen these before:

1. Scope - SCI only, or all intelligence?
2. Access by foreign nationals - owner concurrence?
3. Resources required for implementation.
4. Multilevel mode operations.

25X1

advised that the DCID Rewriting Group meets every two weeks (26 February was next scheduled). They are now working on the final recommendations for channeling through the approval process. IHC members have been requested to work with their agency/department Forum representative to 25X1 ensure a united front in their positions. To a question, _____ said the unresolved matters will be presented to the DCI in an Issue Paper format 25X1 modeled after that used in JCS papers.

25X1

3. _____ an NSA rotational detailee to the ICS, took the floor next for a briefing on the INF Monitoring Program. His presentation was well organized, enhanced with visual aids, and gave the group an educational review of the aspects of the INF Treaty implementation that security managers would 25X1 not necessarily be afforded as a matter of course. _____ was candid in answering questions and provided some privileged information aside from the 25X1 _____ content.

4. Old Business

o   The joint FBI-CIA warning notice relative to potential vulnerabilities in the use of commercial conference facilities was provided to the Executive Secretary. Copies are attached for members to review and comment on at the next meeting. Please note the Secret classification. Also please return copies of the CIA-prepared draft to the FBI representative at the 14 March meeting.

25X1

o   _____ was not present to report on his attempts to meet and negotiate with officials in the DoD Office of General Counsel 25X1 relative to the personal liability amendment matter. _____ will be asked for a status report at the next meeting.

o   A draft policy statement concerning the introduction of SAP/SAR activities in SCIFs was provided to all members present for review and discussion at the March meeting. This product of FPWG efforts is only intended as a draft.

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o   Relative to a STU-III policy paper, the FPWG is working on such a
draft for Forum review. The FPWG met on 2 March and the Chairman is
hopeful that a draft will be ready for distribution at the 14 March
meeting. This topic generated (again) lively and disparate comments
from several members. A sense of urgency is evident in the need to
produce policy guidance to intended users. The FPWG is aware of the
urgency, and the 2 March meeting was scheduled out-of-cycle to
specifically work the STU-III paper. It was remarked that $46M has
been committed for this program by DoD as illustration of the
importance attached to the matter. Mr. Anderson said it was vital
that we get something out quickly, even if it was general guidance.

25X1

5. New Business

o   The Army representative provided a paper, distributed to all members,
relative to improper automated distribution of ORCON message traffic
within the Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC). Army has taken
corrective action not only in the PTC but throughout their service to
prevent the similar improper distribution of controlled information
elsewhere. The purpose of Army's paper was clearly stated to alert
all members to this potential security hazard in automated
distribution systems. Army also recommends that members review and
analyze their agency/department traffic distribution procedures for
revision and correction of deficiencies as necessary. (Note: This
should be a subject worthy of revisiting after members have had an
opportunity to examine their systems as recommended in Army's
memorandum.)

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6. There were no other offerings under new business, and the meeting
concluded with the announcement that the next meeting would take place on 14
March in Room 6100, Main Justice, at 1300 hours. The agenda for the meeting
is attached. Attendees might find it prudent to anticipate a meeting duration
of 90 minutes considering the potential for extended discussions on the
STU-III and SAP/SAR/SCIF matters. Members are asked to confirm their intent
to attend by calling   not
later than COB on 11 March.

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Attachments: A. FBI notice re conference facilities
B. Agenda

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Agenda, Seventeenth Meeting, DCI Security Forum

14 March 1988, 1300 hours, Room 6100, Main Justice Building

o   Acceptance of the minutes of the 8 February 1988 meeting

o   Address by Guest

STAT
    [   ] Chairman, Information Handling Committee, Intelligence
    Community Staff, to deliver remarks about the DCID 1/16 revision process.

o   Old Business

    -   Members comments on the FBI-CIA warning notice relative to potential
        vulnerabilities in commercial conference facilities

    -   Members comments and discussion on the SAP/SAR/SCIF policy statement
        provided at last meeting with objective of approval

STAT
    -   [   ] status report on coordination efforts with DoD General
        Counsel on Personal Liability Amendment

    -   CIA status report on efforts of 4C Working Group in analysis of
        mechanisms to facilitate Community exchange of personnel security
        information

    -   *Review and discussion of STU-III Procedures Policy paper draft

STAT
    -   [   ] comments on Supreme Court decision in the Egan case
        (handed down 23 Feb 88)

    -   Other?

o   New Business

    -   Offerings optional by members

    -   Other?

o   Scheduling of next meeting - 11 April 1988 (?)

*Contingent upon the FPWG's ability to complete in time for this meeting.

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2/5/88

Debbie

STAT

Att passed to [redacted]

in prep for Forum meet,
8 Feb. This for info to

STAT [redacted]

STAT [redacted] going to

meet w/ [redacted] today. I could

not go due priority paper

required here so I quickly put

STAT this together for [redacted]

8 Feb 1988

INFORMATION

under the New Business

bullet - line 3 - Pls revise to read

TAB D, by my rapid scan, is apparently akin to ORCON issues faced before. The particular problem cited has been addressed head-on by Army and calls for a reworking of software in some, how many is unknown, ADP systems. Suggest you solicit comments from members and judge where to take it next... perhaps report at next meeting to learn if similar problem exists elsewhere.

STAT

Pre-Meeting Brief Notes for 8 February 1988 Forum

Following the Agenda:

o   Minutes acceptance - Anticipate Maynard may have comment to correct
     paragraph 10, lines 8 and 9. I corrected one error without stating so in
     the minutes. He had said 50 mile radius when he meant 50km. Since our
     meeting I have learned that the Soviet inspectors may travel in a
     50km/31mi radius of the portal inspection site only, not each inspection
     site. If Maynard does not offer the correction, the Chairman should, in
     as discreet a manner as appropriate. I'll take the error, inferred or
     stated, as my misunderstanding. Reference from INF attached (TAB A).

         Info related indirectly - should the dialogue lead in the direction
     of Soviet inspectors' accessibility to surrounding environs at other
     inspection sites, it is significant that an inspection must be completed
     within 24 hours (8 hour extension may be granted by US inspected
     authorities). Each inspection is preceded by a one hour security and
     safety briefing and then the 24-hour clock starts without interruption or
     "time-outs." Thus the inspectors, under escort, will have slight
     opportunity to do more than their inspection duties.

25X1 o   Presentation by   IHC/ICS -   was told he had 15 minutes.
     He'll likely use viewgraphs and take questions to update us on the status
     of a handful of unresolved DCID 1/16 issues.

25X1 o   Presentation by   - brief bio profile attached as TAB B. Mike
     has a 30-minute briefing with viewgraphs on the monitoring aspects of
     INF. The briefing is classified at TS/TK level. He will take questions
     following his pitch.

o   Update on FBI/CIA production of notification of opposition targeting
     conference facilities. I'm told this is on hold, with the Bureau trying
     to come up with a less revealing, yet effective, sheet of music on this.

25X1 o   Update from   on attempt to work agreeable position of personal
     liability amendment in coordination/consultation with DoD General
25X1 Counsel. I don't believe there is anything new on this but   will say
   something. No action expected. This is lawyer-to-lawyer stuff.

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o Presentation via handout of the FPWG product <u>draft</u> of policy statement concerning introduction of SAP/SAR activity <u>into</u> SCIFs (TAB C). Note that OSD sees no need for the policy statement. I've been told their unified position (including Maynard) is that the DCI has authority to put SCI in SCIFs and to decree how to construct and protect a SCIF, but nowhere is it stated that the DCI can deny introduction of other material in a SCIF. OSD is technically correct since the IPM, SISR, and DCIDs don't address this specifically. Obviously it has always been generally inferred but not stated. I think Maynard will not fight strenuously. He wants only that the SOIC has authority to approve SAP/SAR and other activities in SCIFs under his (SOIC) cognizance. Fred has good comments on this he can add.

o Update on FPWG efforts to draft STU-III policy statement on procedural use. In the interest of brevity here, Fred can provide info. Bottom line is the draft is being put together and another meeting in March will bring the FPWG closer to a draft paper. It is a complex affair and frankly, the NSA COMSEC people who addressed the FPWG on 3 February raised more questions and surfaced more complexities. Hopefully [ ] will be able to give you better picture.

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o If time permits and prudence permits, it may be advisable to announce that D/ICS will be sending communication to all Community organizations instructing continued use of 4193 or equivalent <u>with</u> the approved language addendum.

o New Business - Col Linnen has an item with the title "Security and Automated Distribution" which he wants to surface for our consideration. TAB D, by my rapid scan, looks like a repeat of past problems encountered in control of ORCON. Policy now is for SOIC to work with counterpart SOIC in resolution.

o Other? Always a guess.

o Next meeting - 7 March unless objectionable to majority.

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
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STAT

o   NSA officer on rotational assignment to ICS

o   Joined ICS in June 1986 (Programs and Budget Office)

o   Currently assigned as the Program Monitor for the National Intelligence
Emergency Support Program (NIESP)

o   I am also responsible for all Survivability issues and serve as D/ICS's
representative on the Strategic Arms Monitoring Working Group (SAMWG).
The SAMWG represents the DCI on all Arms Control Matters with the White
House and Congress.

I have served for 16 years in the SIGINT field at NSA and around the World.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON. DC 20310-1001

2 6 JAN 1988

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DAMI-CIS (380)

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY INFORMATION SYSTEMS
COMMAND, FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA 85613-5000

SUBJECT: Security and Automated Distribution

1. Dissemination and Extraction Controlled by Originator (ORCON) message traffic is being routed to unauthorized persons by means of an automatic dissemination system within the Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC). This issue surfaced last November when the VCSA questioned whether the ORCON message at Enclosure 1 was correctly classified and protected in view of its sensitivity, and asked that I devise policies and procedures to resolve this problem.

2. As you know, the ORCON caveat is applied to very sensitive intelligence to allow the originator to continually control and supervise the information's use. This is the most restrictive intelligence marking, and, as such, requires the originator's permission in advance before we may disseminate the material beyond recipient Headquarters, incorporate it into briefings, or use it in investigations (Enclosure 2).

3. The steps followed by AMC in classifying their message were correct. In every case, permission for use of the ORCON material had been requested and granted (see attachment to Enclosure 1). However, when the ORCON message was processed through the PTC it was distributed to agencies not approved by the originator.

4. Classified traffic, including ORCON, is routed by the PTC computer to agencies based upon Statement of Interest (SOI) keywords in the text of each message. Activities only need to request to be added to a particular SOI keyword list to obtain all traffic containing that keyword. If an agency on a keyword list isn't included in the originator's message distribution, the PTC computer automatically adds separate addressees (action or information) to the bottom of the message. Such was the case with AMC's message. Ironically, under the keyword system, a larger number of unauthorized copies of ORCON messages can be distributed to non-essential elements than those sent to agencies designated by an originator.

5. This problem is not limited to the Army, and apparently involves a huge volume of ORCON traffic. The PTC typically receives more than 100 ORCON messages a day. The majority of

DAMI-CIS (380)
SUBJECT: Security and Automated Distribution

these - about 90 percent - are JCS readdressals of CIA or DIA
messages. These readdressals contain a generic Army address
(e.g. HQDA WASH DC) automatically added by the JCS computer -
again, based upon SOI keywords in the text of the message.
Although it may appear the system is condoned, it's clear it
undermines an originator's control of ORCON materials. Therefore,
I plan to raise this issue at the next DCI Security Forum for
Intelligence Community resolution.

6.   In the meantime, to resolve the ORCON distribution problem
within the Army, we must stop distributing ORCON traffic under
the keyword system. I recommend the PTC computer, and similar
systems Army-wide be reprogrammed to implement this requirement:

     a.   ORCON traffic containing an originator's specific routing
instructions will be sent only to those designated Army agencies.
These activities will be responsible for coordinating with the
originator as well as the Headquarters staff.

     b.   Copies of generically-addressed ORCON traffic are to be
sent to the command group for review (The Chief of Staff's office
in this building); from there, it will be forwarded to the
appropriate Army activity for action. Again, the action agency
remains responsible for coordination with the originator as well
as the staff.

7.   Standing distribution lists, such as the SOI keyword system,
represent a major security vulnerability because they negate the
concept of need-to-know, and continue to grow over time. Because
of this, I ask you to initiate a one-time, one hundred percent
review of existing SOI keyword lists. Such a review is con-
sistent with the new security policy which requires an annual,
written reverification of each recipient's need-to-know
(Enclosure 3). I have solicited the support of MACOM and
Headquarters agency heads in scrubbing these lists to the bare
minimum.

8.   SAIS concurs in the above course of action. Please ensure
the review is accomplished, and the necessary technical hardware
and/or software changes are implemented Army-wide, to include
within the PTC.

3 Encls   SIDNEY T. WEINSTEIN
                                 Lieutenant General, USA
                                 Deputy Chief of Staff
                                   for Intelligence

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